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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT

V.

PURDUE PHARMA L.P.,
PURDUE PFIARMA INC.; and
THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY, INC.
(dba THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY)
One Stamford Forum
201 Tresser Boulevard
Stamford, CT 06901-3431
Defendants

1.

This civil action is brought by the State o f Maine, through Attorney General G.

Steven Rowe, pursuant to the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act arising out of the Defendants' unfair
and deceptive marketing of the opioid painkiller OxyContin. Although OxyContin is a Schedule II
narcotic with an abuse profile and addictive qualities similar to morphine, Purdue aggressively
promoted OxyContin to doctors, nurses and consumers as a first-choice analgesic for treatment of a
wide variety of pain symptoms. While it expanded the market for OxyContin, Purdue avoided and
minimized the known risks of OxyContin abuse, addiction and diversion.

Purdue failed to

adequately warn doctors or consumers o f OxyContin's significant risks and failed to take reasonable
steps to guard against OxyContin abuse and diversion, instead striving to “educate" doctors and
consumers that concerns over abuse, addiction and diversion of OxyContin were misplaced.
Purdue’s aggressive promotion of OxyContin led to a dramatic increase in OxyContin prescriptions,

which in turn furthered an increase in OxyContin abuse and diversion from legitimate users to illicit
use of OxyContin.

THE PARTIES
2.

The plaintiff, State o f Maine, is represented by the Attorney General who brings this

action in the public interest pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209.
3.

Defendant Purdue Pharma L.P. is a Delaware limited partnership with its principal

place of business at One Stamford Forum, Stamford, Connecticut. At all times relevant to this
Complaint, Purdue Pharma L.P. has been in the business of designing, testing, manufacturing,
labeling, advertising, promoting, marketing, selling, and/or distributing OxyContin throughout the
United States, including the State of Maine.
4.

Defendant Purdue Pharma Inc. is a New York corporation with its principal place of

business at One Stamford Forum, Stamford, Connecticut.

At all times relevant to this Complaint,

Purdue Pharma Inc. has been in the business o f designing, testing, manufacturing, labeling,
advertising, promoting, marketing, selling, and/or distributing OxyContin thr oughout United States,
including the State of Maine. Purdue Pharma Inc. is the general partner o f Purdue Pharma L.P., and
at all relevant times has supervised and managed the operations and affairs o f its subsidiary and
affiliate, Purdue Pharma, L.P.
5.

Defendant The Purdue Frederick Company Inc. (d/b/a/ The Purdue Frederick

Company) is a New York corporation with its principal place of business at One Stamford Forum,
Stamford, Connecticut. At all times relevant to this Complaint, The Purdue Frederick Company,
Inc. has been in the business of designing, testing, manufacturing, labeling, advertising, promoting,
marketing, selling, and/or distributing OxyContin throughout United States, including the State of

Maine.

6.

Because the marketing conduct alleged in this Complaint concerns all defendants, in

this complaint all defendants are collectively referred to as “Purdue.”
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7.

This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and defendants of this action

pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209.
8.

In accordance with 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, venue is proper in this Court.

9.

The Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 205-A etseq., makes unlawful

unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce, and authorizes the
Attorney General to bring enforcement actions to obtain permanent injunctive relief and recover
restitution and civil penalties up to $10,000 for each intentional violation. 5 M.R.S.A. § 207, 209.
FACTS

Purdue Manufactures and Sells OxyContin, a Schedule II Narcotic Opioid
Designed to Treat Serious, Long-Term Pain
10.

OxyContin is an opioid analgesic - a narcotic substance that relieves a person’s

pain without causing the loss of consciousness. OxyContin is a controlled-release form of
oxycodone hydrochloride. Oxycodone is a very powerful pain reliever similar to morphine, and
is the active ingredient in OxyContin as well as oxycodone-combination drugs such as Percocet,
Percodan and Tylox.
11.

Purdue developed and manufactures OxyContin. OxyContin’s controlled release

o f oxycodone purports to facilitate 12-hour dosing for OxyContin, which distinguished it from
other oxycodone tablets typically administered in 4 to 6 hour doses. Due in part to its controlled3

release feature, OxyContin contains more oxycodone than other oxycodone drugs.
12.

OxyContin is a Schedule II narcotic, which means its manufacture and

distribution is subject to the Drug Enforcement Agency’s (“DEA”) regulation and control.
Classification of OxyContin as a Schedule II controlled substance means that the DEA has
determined that OxyContin: i) has a high potential for abuse, ii) has been accepted for medical
use in the United States subject to severe restrictions, and iii) abuse may lead to severe
psychological or physical dependence.
13.

As reflected by the DEA’s oversight, OxyContin has an abuse profile, and

addictive qualities, similar to morphine. Among other things, this means that: first, OxyContin
users experience euphoria, making the drug prone to abuse (/.e., non-medical use); second,
OxyContin causes physical dependence in a short time, meaning that a user will experience
withdrawal symptoms upon terminating use; and third, tolerance is common, meaning that, over
time, dosage often must increase in order to provide the same level o f pain relief.
14.

In sum, opioids like OxyContin cause physical dependence and are prone to abuse

and addiction. As a result, doctors have traditionally, and correctly, exercised caution in
prescribing opioids, weighing their analgesic effect against the risks o f dependence, addiction,
abuse, and diversion from legitimate patients to illicit, non-medical use.
15.

Although OxyContin posed the same risks as MS Contin and other opioids,

Purdue, as part of its marketing strategy, sought to position OxyContin differently from other
opioids by avoiding or minimizing the drug’s known risks.
16.

In December 1995, the FDA approved the use of OxyContin for the following

“indications,” that is, the circumstances for which the FDA has determined that a drug is safe and
4

effective:
Indications: “OxyContin Tablets are a controlled-release oral formulation of
oxycodone hydrochloride indicated for the management of moderate-to-severe
pain where use of an opioid analgesic is appropriate for more than a few days.”
17.

in 2001, the FDA changed the OxyContin indications. OxyContin is now

indicated for the “management o f moderate-to-severe pain when a continuous around-the-clock
analgesic is neededfor an extended period o f time. ”
18.

Since 1995, the FDA also has restricted the appropriate marketing and use of

OxyContin as reflected in the OxyContin label. Among other things, the FDA has determined
that OxyContin, because it has not been shown to be safe and effective for these uses, should not
be promoted:
•

for use as a prn analgesic. “Pin” means as needed, or as required.

•

for use as a preemptive analgesia (pre-operative), that is, not to be administered in
advance of an operation for expected pain.

•

for post-operative pain in patients not already on OxyContin.

•

for post-operative pain unless the pain is moderate-to-severe and expected to
persist for extended period.

•

where contraindicated for patients with significant respiratory depression, acute or
severe bronchial asthma or hypercarbia, or with paralytic ileus.

Purdue Promoted OxyContin through a
Multifaceted Marketing Campaign
19.

Purdue has marketed OxyContin to doctors, dentists, nurses, other healthcare

professionals, and patients. Purdue’s goals have been to increase the number o f doctors
prescribing OxyContin, increase the number o f patients taking OxyContin, and increase the
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OxyContin dosages prescribed by doctors, all in order to increase OxyContin sales and generate
profits for Purdue.
20.

Purdue has, at various times:

a)

employed hundreds of sales representatives paid to visit with doctors, nurses,
pharmacists and other health care professionals to expand the prescription writing
base and increase prescription writing for OxyContin;

b)

prepared and distributed sales aids, visuals, hand outs, and “leave behind”
promotional items to be used by sales representatives and distributed to healthcare
professionals;

c)

conducted seminars, trainings and purported educational programs for health care
professionals to promote treatment o f pain via increased opioid usage, specifically
OxyContin;

d)

placed OxyContin advertisements in medical journals and other publications
directed at healthcare professionals;

e)

maintained websites directed at patients, patient families, and healthcare
professionals promoting pain treatment, specifically via prescribing OxyContin or
other opioids;

21.

Purdue’s sales efforts are directed to: i) get doctors to prescribe and nurses to

recommend OxyContin, ii) ensure that hospitals and managed care organizations place
OxyContin on their drug formularies and treat it favorably vis-a-vis other painkillers, iii)
encourage pharmacies to stock OxyContin, in all prescription strengths, and iv) encourage
hospitals and long term care facilities to purchase and use OxyContin for their patients.
22.

The bulk o f sales representatives’ efforts focus on visiting doctors, nurses and

other medical staff. Purdue provides its sales representatives with precise information on
doctors’ prescribing histories for OxyContin and other opioid painkillers. Armed with this
information, Purdue and its sales representatives identify “core” physicians and “A -l” sales
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targets, who are deemed to be actual or potential high-volume prescribes o f OxyContin.
23.

Purdue sales representatives visited these doctors and their staffs to encourage use

of OxyContin. If a doctor prescribed opioids other than OxyContin, Purdue sales reps
encouraged them to switch to OxyContin. If a doctor already prescribed OxyContin, Purdue
sales representatives encouraged OxyContin for more patients, for broader uses, and in increased
dosages or strengths.
24.

Purdue linked sales representatives’ compensation directly to increased

OxyContin prescribing by those doctors and institutions in the representatives’ territory, as
discussed further below.
25.

Purdue designed its seminars, trainings and “educational” programs for doctors,

pharmacists and nurses to serve the same goals as Purdue’s office sales visits: promote
OxyContin as the opioid o f choice, get healthcare professionals “comfortable” with prescribing
high strength narcotic opioids, and ultimately increase OxyContin prescriptions.
26.

Regardless of the promotion medium, Purdue and its sales representatives echoed

several simple OxyContin sales messages, consistently reflected in Purdue’s advertisements,
marketing plans and instructions to sales representatives. With respect to encouraging doctors to
prescribe OxyContin, Purdue sought to:
•

“enhance the acceptance o f opioids for non-cancer pain,” and, with respect to
OxyContin, avoid any stigma attached to use of opiates;

•

expand OxyContin tablets use in non-malignant pain market by positioning it as
“the one to start with and the one to stay with;”

•

establish OxyContin as the first-line choice at Step 2 o f the WHO pain ladder
(mild to moderate pain);
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•

increase the use of OxyContin tablets for a wide variety o f conditions, and for
acute and sub-acute pain (e.g., “post-op pain, trauma, fractures”); and

•

encourage assessment o f pain by physicians and communication o f pain by
patients, and attach an emotional aspect to non-cancer pain so physicians treat it
more aggressively.

27.

With respect to the characteristics o f OxyContin itself, Purdue’s marketing

emphasized:

28.

•

that OxyContin is strong (“It Works”);

•

the duration of pain control —that unlike other oxycodone medication, OxyContin
need only be taken every 12 hours;

•

the convenience of 12 hour dosing as compared to 4 or 6 hour analgesics (print
ads showing six dosage cups vs. two and stating “the hard way vs. the easy way”);

•

that OxyContin acts quickly —that the onset o f analgesia is within one hour in
most patients; and

•

that OxyContin was “appropriate for a wide range o f patients.”
Purdue promoted OxyContin to a wide variety of doctors, without regard for their

training or experience prescribing opioids, encouraging OxyContin for an ever-increasing list o f
conditions, and patient types. While expanding the market in this way, Purdue failed to
adequately account for known health and safety risks of OxyContin, especially the risks of
OxyContin abuse, dependence, addiction and diversion.

Purdue’s Marketing Strategy was to Steadily Expand OxyContin Usage
from Cancer Pain Treatment to a Wide Array of Ailments
29.

At the outset of the OxyContin launch, Purdue briefly marketed OxyContin
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principally for treatment of chronic pain in cancer patients. That quickly changed. Beginning in
1996, Purdue consistently expanded: a) the types o f doctors and healthcare professionals to
whom it promotes OxyContin; b) the classes o f patients for whom it encourages OxyContin to be
prescribed; and c) the array of diseases and types o f pain for which it promotes OxyContin use.
30.

One step in Purdue’s plan to expand OxyContin use to all sorts o f pain was its

decision to focus its sales efforts on primary care physicians (“PCPs”).
31.

Purdue targeted PCPs as a fruitful avenue to increased OxyContin sales. Sales

representatives visited thousands o f primary care physicians and sought to convince them that
OxyContin was an appropriate first-line painkiller for a wide variety o f ailments. More than half
of doctor visits by Purdue sales reps were to PCPs. The aggressive marketing to PCPs paid off:
Since 2002, PCPs have accounted for nearly half o f all OxyContin prescriptions.
32.

Purdue’s promotional efforts also targeted additional types o f physicians,

eventually including surgeons, gerontologists, rheumatologists, orthopedics, arthritis specialists,
obstetricians and gynecologists, emergency medicine physicians, and dentists. Purdue failed to
take meaningful steps to educate these doctors on the risks of opioid use, abuse, addiction and
diversion. Instead, Purdue repeated its simple sales messages: pain is undertreated, OxyContin
provides easy dosing and prompt relief, and is the “one to start with and to stay with.”
33.

Purdue consistently expanded the pain ailments for which it aggressively

promoted OxyContin, without a concomitant focus on limiting OxyContin to serious and
prolonged pain.
34.

As Purdue’s promotional activities expanded the proposed uses for OxyContin -

to include many diseases and many types of pain -- Purdue’s marketing strategy minimized
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OxyContin’s risks. Instead of recommending caution in the use o f a Schedule II narcotic with an
abuse profile similar to morphine, Purdue in essence pitched OxyContin as simply a powerful
pain reliever —for many types o f pain and for many types sorts o f patients - with few
precautions to guard against its capacity for abuse, dependence, addiction and diversion.
35.

Purdue also failed to closely follow appropriate step therapy and instead promoted

OxyContin as the first-line pain reliever that could be used to treat all levels o f pain —“the one to
start with and stay with” and “the easy way.”
36.

Purdue’s sales strategy to expand OxyContin’s prescriber base and patient

population was successful. Within years o f its launch and through the present, OxyContin was
and is prescribed by a wide range o f doctors for a wide range o f pain ailments.

While Expanding the Prescriber Base and Usage of OxyContin,
Purdue Failed to Adequately Focus on OxyContin’s Health and Safety Risks,
Especially the Risks Related to Abuse and Diversion
37.

From its product launch, Purdue knew that OxyContin was prone to abuse,

dependence, addiction and diversion. But the linchpin o f Purdue’s marketing strategy was to
distinguish OxyContin from other opioids and their well known risk o f abuse, and to avoid the
stigma attached to these other opioids, particularly morphine. Purdue’s sales strategy focused on
getting doctors “comfortable” with prescribing OxyContin, even though prescribing opioids
warrants that doctors exercise caution, and OxyContin did not warrant different treatment.
38.

In 2001, amidst significant media coverage of widespread OxyContin abuse,

diversion and addiction, the FDA required Purdue to significantly alter its label to provide a socalled “black box” warning, including the following:
Warning: OxyContin is an opioid agonist and a Schedule II controlled
10

substance with an abuse liability similar to morphine.
OxyContin Tablets are to be swallowed whole, and are not to be broken,
chewed or crushed. Taking broken, chewed or crushed OxyContin Tablets leads
to rapid release and absorption o f a potentially fatal dose o f oxycodone.
39.

Even after the FDA required Purdue to bolster its OxyContin warning, Purdue

continued to minimize the risks of abuse, addiction and diversion in its marketing. Instead,
Purdue repeated its message that pain is undertreated, that patients deserve opioid treatment, and
that OxyContin is the answer. Any meaningful message on the risks o f abuse, addiction and
diversion would have undermined Purdue’s sales objectives, and Purdue avoided it.
40.

Purdue sought to portray “addiction” to opioids as exceedingly rare. By way of

example, Purdue’s videotape “From One Patient to Another,” advised patients that “Less than
1% of patients talcing opioids actually become addicted.” A Purdue pamphlet entitled
“Counseling Your Patients and Families Regarding the Use o f Opioids,” stated: “Many patients - and family members —will be surprised to discover that fewer than 1% o f opioid-using patients
become addicted.” Purdue’s focus on “addiction,” narrowly defined, to the exclusion o f broader
concepts o f psychological dependence, physical dependence, tolerance and abuse, made its
representations misleading.
41.

If doctors expressed concern over using OxyContin due to its capacity for abuse,

dependence or addiction, Purdue trained its sales representatives to avoid and minimize those
concerns.
42.

Although Purdue, in response to public scrutiny o f widespread OxyContin abuse,

has claimed to implement programs designed to guard against diversion and abuse, it has
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continued to try to convince doctors that their concerns o f addiction, dependence and abuse are
misplaced.

Purdue Employed a Sales Approach and Incentive System that Exacerbated, Rather Than
Guarded Against, the Risk of OxyContin Abuse, Addiction and Diversion
43.

Purdue sales representatives were compensated in large measure for increasing the

volume of OxyContin prescribed and sold. Purdue’s sales goals were plain: to increase the
number of doctors prescribing OxyContin, to increase the number o f prescriptions written by
each, and to increase dosages o f OxyContin. Purdue’s sales approach and incentive system failed
to adequately balance Purdue’s desire for increased OxyContin sales with safeguards against
OxyContin abuse, addiction and diversion.
44.

Both through its compensation structure and through its sales managers, Purdue

cultivated a high pressure environment for its sales representatives. This pressure to increase
sales was not properly balanced against public safety and failed to account for the known risks of
OxyContin.
45.

Purdue also instructed its sales representatives to focus their sales efforts on those

doctors who already prescribed the greatest amount o f OxyContin, urging them to write more
prescriptions for more patients. Using detailed prescribing, data on doctors, Purdue sales
representatives strove to increase “new starts” and increase prescription volume by these key
prescribes.
46.

These aspects o f Purdue’s sales and incentive system all served to promote, not

guard against, OxyContin abuse, diversion and addiction.
47.

Purdue also failed to use its detailed prescribing information on doctors to guard
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against OxyContin abusé and diversion, Purdue, since OxyContin’s launch, purchased detailed
prescribing data from IMS Health (“IMS data”)? showing the prescribing history and patterns of
doctors, including the number o f OxyContin prescriptions written, the dosages, as well as the
same prescribing information with respect to competing opioids and other drugs. Purdue
provides each sales representative this prescribing information for target doctors in their territory.
48.

Purdue could have used the prescribing data to readily identify potential sources

of abuse and diversion, such as “pill mills” that divert OxyContin to the illicit street market.
Purdue then could have employed meaningful internal measures to guard against abuse and
diversion risks. For instance, Purdue could have visited those doctors to review pain
documentation practices or otherwise protect against potential abuse or diversion. Or, the
company could have shared with law enforcement those prescribing patterns that evidenced a
risk of abuse or diversion. For years, Purdue did not take those steps.
49.

Purdue, notwithstanding its marketing claims focused on fighting abuse and

diversion, declined to use the IMS prescribing data to protect against abuse and diversion risks.
Purdue sales representatives instead targeted the highest prescribes and encouraged them to
prescribe more OxyContin, in larger doses, to more patients. Purdue’s marketing practices thus
exacerbated the abuse and diversion risks.
50.

Purdue’s OxyContin marketing resulted in dramatic increases in OxyContin

prescriptions.
51.

On or about October 12, 2004, Purdue entered into a tolling agreement with the

State of Maine with respect to the State o f Maine’s claims against Purdue, tolling the application
of the statute of limitations from May 12, 2004 through the filing o f this Complaint.
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CAUSES OF ACTION

Count One
(Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices in violation o f the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act)
52.

The State of Maine incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through

51 of the Complaint.
53.

Purdue engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in its marketing, promotion

and sale of OxyContin, including without limitation:
a)

aggressively marketing OxyContin to a broad variety of doctors and patients, for an
ever expanding array of ailments, sometimes contrary to its label and indications,
while failing to adequately disclose and reasonably warn of and guard against the
health and safety risks associated with OxyContin, including the risks associated with
misuse, abuse, dependence, addiction and diversion;

b)

avoiding or minimizing the known risks o f OxyContin, including the risks o f abuse,
dependence, addiction and diversion; and

c)

employing a sales and incentive program that failed to reasonably guard against
OxyContin abuse and diversion.

54.

Purdue knew or should have known that its conduct was unfair or deceptive in

violation of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act.
RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff requests that this court:
1.

Enter judgment in favor o f the Plaintiff and against the defendants under the Maine

Unfair Trade Practices Act, and permanently enjoin Purdue from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts
and practices in the marketing and promotion of OxyContin.
2.

Order the defendants to pay civil penalties for each intentional violation of the Maine

Unfair Trade Practices Act;
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3.

Order defendants to pay the costs of investigation and litigation, including attorneys’

fees, pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209; and
4.

Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable and proper.

Dated at Augusta, Maine this 8th day of May, 2007.

Respectfully submitted,
PLAINTIFF STATE OF MAINE
G. STEVEN ROWE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
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Ua M ^ J X ^ iP ^
Christina M. Moylan
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Maine Bar No. 7095

